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A Comparison of Forestry Laws in the
United States and Brazil as They
Promote Deforestation in Southeastern
Alaska and the Amazon Basin
By JULIA LEVIN*
Member of the Class of 1991
At a recent Senate hearing, Senator Wirth (D. Colo.) asked:
How can we say to the .Brazilians that we want to work with them so
they do not tear down the rain forest in the Amazon when in fact what
we are doing in Alaska is to tear down the last great rain forest in
North America?
Not only tearing it down, but tearing it down at taxpayers'
expense .... 1
L INTRODUCTION
Half of the world's rain forests have been destroyed.2 At the present
rate of decimation, the remainder will be irretrievably lost in the next
forty years.' The world has focused considerable attention in the last few
years on the importance and fragility of its rain forests. The forests pro-
vide habitat for over a million plant and animal species, more than half of
the species on earth.' Tropical rain forests are also abundant in raw
materials such as timber, rubber, oils, pharmaceutical ingredients, fruits,
nuts, and spices.5 In addition to their incredible biological diversity, rain
forests play a critical role in the regulation of the world's climate and
weather patterns.6 The Amazon River basin alone contains nearly two-
* B.A. 1985, Brown University.
1. Tongass National Forest Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Land, National
Parks and Forests of the Senate Comm. on EnergV and Natural Resources, 101st Cong, 1st
Sess. 84-85 (1989) [hereinafter Hearing on the Tongass National Forest].
2. L. SiLcocy, THE RAINFonors - A CELEBRATION 10 (1990).
3. Id at 11.
4. C. CAUFiELD, IN THE RAINFoREST 59 (1984).
5. Guppy, Tropical Deforestation: A Global View, 62 FOREIGN AFP. 928 (1984).
6. Id at 931. Rain forests hold rainfall and groundwater close to the earth's surface,
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thirds of the world's fresh water, and absorbs a large percentage of the
world's carbon dioxide, helping to alleviate the greenhouse effect.7
However, the richness and complexity of the rain forest ecosystem
renders the forests very fragile and incapable of regeneration once de-
stroyed.' Rain forests have developed over millions of years into highly
interdependent communities whose components are continually recycled
to provide nutrients for new life.9 Without the trees arid other vegeta-
tion, rain forest soils quickly deteriorate and become unproductive.10
Rain forest destruction will convert most of the world's rain forests to
deserts by the early twenty-first century. 1 In the Amazon alone, half a
million square kilometers, an area the size of France, are razed every five
years. 
12
Several countries have passed legislation, and the international com-
munity has adopted numerous resolutions, to stem rain forest destruction
in South America and Southeast Asia. At the same time, the United
States has permitted the destruction of the world's largest temperate rain
forest, the Tongass National Forest in Alaska, at an equally alarming
rate.13
The Tongass is the largest national forest in the United States and
one of the world's last old-growth, temperate rain forests.1 4 The forest
contains a diversity of natural resources and wildlife found nowhere else
releasing the water slowly into aquifers and rivers, or transpiring water vapor from leaves,
which later provide rainfall in other areas of the world. Tropical rain forests also moderate the
earth's surface temperatures and reduce heat reflection back into the atmosphere. Id. at 928-
29.
7. Bunyard, World Climate and Tropical Forest Destruction, '15 ECOLOGIST 125, 125-26
(1985). The rain forest uses solar energy to convert carbon dioxide and water into sugars,
starches, oils, and other substances. The forests' absorption of carbon dioxide slows global
warming which is caused by the blanket-like effect of increased carbon dioxide levels in the
earth's atmosphere. Guppy, supra note 5, at 928-31.
8. L. SiLcocK, supra note 2, at 10; Tongass Timber Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 1516
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on the Tongass Timber
Reform Act] (statement of Lynn Greenwalt, on behalf of the National Wildlife Federation).
9. L. SILCOCK, supra note 2, at 10.
10. Id.
11. Plumwood & Routley, World Rainforest Destruction - The Social Factors, 12 ECOLO-
GiST 4 (1982).
12. Lutzenberger, The Systematic Demolition of the Tropical Rain Forest in the Amazon,
12 ECOLOGIST 248 (1982).
13. 136 CONG. REc. S7741-42 (daily ed. June 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Wirth),
14. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 212 (statement of Lynn
Greenwalt).
Temperate rain forests are those forests which do not lie between the tropics of Cancer
and Capricorn, as do their tropical counterparts. Old-growth forests are those forests with
trees of various ages, at least some of which are 200 or more years old, and are at various
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in the country: the world's largest concentrations of bald eagles and griz-
zly bears, 200 to 800 year old trees, wolves, brown bears, deer, moose,
seals, sea lions, and ravens. 5 While few Americans condone cutting and
burning the rain forests of the Amazon River basin in Brazil,16 the
United States Forest Service (the Forest Service) continues to subsidize
clearcutting of the Tongass. 7 In fact, clearcutting is the primary method
of timber harvesting for most national forests in the United States.'
At first glance, Brazil appears to be more desperate to exploit the
natural resources of the Amazon than the United States is to exploit
southeastern Alaska. Yet, the underlying causes are actually quite simi-
lar. Both countries' forestry policies began as attempts to create jobs,
attract settlers to frontier areas, and provide economic stability to the
regions. 9 Government subsidies and tax incentives in the two countries
have resulted, instead, in expansive bureaucracies which promote large-
scale development, particularly of the regional infrastructures?20 The
subsidies and development programs have also created very powerful pri-
vate industries, which have little incentive to preserve the rain forests'
resources.
The United States and Brazil base their forestry practices on the
assumption that development is a good and necessary aspect of their
economies, yet neither country's forestry laws promote sustainable devel-
opment. Without government subsidies, forest destruction would de-
crease significantly.2 If Brazil and the United States discontinued their
subsidies and instead promoted sustainable, alternative uses of their for-
stages of growth and decay. Old-growth forests support a wider variety of plant and animal
species than do forests of uniform age and development. Id
15. Hearing on the Tongass National Forest, supra note 1, at 1, 82.
16. S. BUNKER, UNDERDEVELOPING THE AMAZON - EXTRACTION, UNEQUAL EX-
CHANGE, AND THE FAILURE OF THE MODERN STATE 91-92 (1985). The forests of the Ama-
zon are cut and burned primarily to clear the lands for cattle ranching, agriculture, and other
development projects, rather than for the value of the wood contained in the forests. Il
17. Tongass Timber Reform Act" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water, Power, and
Offshore Energy Resources of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cons.,
1st Sess. 14-18 (1989) (statement of Rep. Mrazek, sponsor of H.R. 987) [hereinafter Hearing
on H.R. 9871.
18. R. O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 99 (1988). Clearcutting removes all
trees from a forest area, rather than leaving a variety of trees to provide habitat, shelter, and
nutrients and seeds for regeneration. Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in
the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REv. 1, 129 (1985).
19. See generally Hearing on the Tongass National Forest, supra note 1; R. RE,'Erro, THE
FOREST FOR THE TREES? GOVERNMENT PoLiCIES AND THE MISUSE OF FOREST RESOURCES
vii (1988).
20. See generally R. REPTrro, supra note 19.
21. Ide at 12-17.
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ests, they would be able to prevent further rain forest destruction. This
Note sets forth and compares several of the causes of deforestation in the
Tongass National Forest and the Brazilian Amazon. It then analyzes
recent legislation in the United States and Brazil to reduce further rain
forest destruction. Finally, the Note concludes with proposals for sus-
tainable forestry practices.
HI. UNITED STATES FOREST POLICY
A. The Forest Service Mandate
The U.S. Forest Service began in 1905 with a charter to "regulate
[the] occupancy and use" of the national forests to "preserve [them] from
destruction."22 Prior to World War II, the Forest Service served primar-
ily as a custodian, rather than an active manager, of the national forest
lands.23 The timber industry owned adequate forest reserves to meet its
needs without resort to national forests.24 The post-World War II hous-
ing boom and the depletion of private timber supplies in many parts of
the country increased demand for national forest timber, which in turn
expanded the role of the Forest Service.25 The Forest Service trans-
formed from a custodian to an active supplier of forest lands for the use
of private industry.26
In its new role as supplier, the Forest Service rapidly expanded its
operations. During the 1950s the Forest Service commenced extensive
road construction programs to provide access to timber stands, and
doubled the allowable -volume of timber sales from national forest
lands.27 During the same period, recreational use of the national forests
more than tripled, which triggered conflicts between the various forest
users.28 Conservationists also began to protest that the Forest Service
was not adequately protecting wilderness areas.29 In response, the Forest
Service proposed the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY), which
Congress enacted in 1960.30 MUSY requires the agency to give equal
22. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 18, at 15; see also R. REPETro, supra note 19, at
90.
23. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 207 (statement of Gay-
lord Nelson for the Wilderness Society).
24. Id; see also R. REPETTO, supra note 19, at 90.
25. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 18, at 21.
26. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 18, at 25-29.
27. R. O'TooLE, supra note 18, at 21. The allowable volume of timber sales from national
forest lands increased from 5.6 billion board feet in 1950 to 12.8 billion by 1968. Id.
28. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 18, at 28-29.
29. Id at 29.
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988).
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consideration to all resources on the national forests, including recrea-
tion, range, timber, watershed, wildlife, and fish.3 1 However, MUSY
does not necessarily require the agency to protect and promote the re-
sources equally. 2 In the absence of specific standards for balancing the
various uses, the Forest Service continued to regard nontimber resources
as of secondary value.33
In the early 1970s the Senate Public Lands Subcommittee recom-
mended guidelines for timber production which sought to mitigate the
effects of excessive clearcutting. 34 The guidelines identified several areas
where timber harvesting should not occur: "areas of special scenic val-
ues, fragile soils, or other limiting physiographic conditions, areas where
adequate regeneration could not be assured, and areas where the costs of
special measures to avoid environmental damage or assure regeneration
were so high that the activity was imprudent and relatively uneco-
nomic."3 The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)
adopted these guidelines and also added a provision precluding timber
harvesting which would cause serious damage to water condition or fish
habitat. 6 The NFMA also limits the allowable sale of timber to a level
which complies with the multiple use and sustained yield objectives of
MUSY. 37
Despite NFMA guidelines and subsequent attempts by Congress to
restrict timber operations, the Forest Service continues to emphasize tim-
ber sales at the expense of other resources.38 Although the Forest Service
31. I Section 528 provides: "It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are
established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and
wildlife and fish purposes."
32. Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979) (MUSY "can hardly be con-
sidered concrete limits upon agency discretion."). See also M.R. REP. No. 1551, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1960).
33. R. O'TooLE, supra note 18, at 99.
34. "Clear-Cutting"Practices on National Timberlands: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 920
(statement of Edward P. Cliff, Chief of the Forest Service) (1971). Harm from clearcutting
includes soil erosion, flooding, destruction of wildlife habitat, and loss of old.growth trees. Id
35. Forest and Rangeland Management Joint Hearings on S. 285, & 2926 and S 3091
Before the Subcomm. on Environment, Soil Conservation, and Forestry of the Senate Comm. on
Agriculture and Forestry and the Subcomm on the Environment and Land Resources of the
Senate Comm on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 958 (1976).
36. National Forest Management Act of 1976 [NFMA], Pub. L No. 94-588,
§ 6(gX3)(E)(iii), 90 Stat. 2949, 2954 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(gX3)(E)(iii) (1988)).
37. Id § 6(e), (k), 90 Stat. 2949, 2952, 2955 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e), (k) (1988)).
To provide a sustainable supply of timber, the rate of harvest must not be faster than the rate
of regeneration.
38. R. REPro, supra note 19, at viii, 2; see also 136 CONG. REc. S7731 (daily ed. June
12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Johnston).
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must consider the economic effects of harvesting timber, NFMA does not
require timber sales to be cost-efficient.39 The Forest Service rarely in-
cludes capital costs, such as road building, in the sale price of timber
harvested on national forest lands." The sale price of timber does not
include the interest on past costs or the discounted value of future bene-
fits.41 Despite the sale of 10 to 11 million board feet of timber per year,
national forest timber sales cost taxpayers 250 to 500 million dollars each
year.42 In addition, the sale of timber for less than its actual value en-
courages wasteful harvest methods to the detriment of other resources,
such as wildlife and recreation.43 The Forest Service concedes that sus-
tainable uses such as tourism and fishing are better both for the environ-
ment and for the local economies. 4 Yet, the Forest Service shows no
interest in revising its current policies to encourage such uses over timber
production.45
The Forest Service continues its inefficient and destructive manage-
ment policies in part because of its institutionalized bureaucracy.46 The
Forest Service currently receives over 300 million dollars a year, approxi-
mately one-quarter of its budget, from gross timber sale receipts, whether
or not those receipts actually exceed the government's costs.47 The in-
come from timber sales is a powerful incentive for the Forest Service to
continue to sell timber, since even sales which lose money contribute to
the agency's budget .4  As forest economist Mr. Randal O'Toole has de-
scribed the Forest Service, "[iln terms of assets, the agency would rank in
the top five in Fortune magazine's list of the nation's 500 largest corpora-
tions. In terms of operating revenues, however, the agency would rank
only number 290. In terms of net income, the Forest Service would be
classified as bankrupt."49
In addition to bureaucratic inertia, local political interests en-
39. NFMA, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 6(g)(3)(A), 90 Stat. 2949, 2953 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1604(g)(3)(A) (1988)); R. REPETro, supra note 19, at 90.
40. R. O'TOoLE, supra note 18, at 27.
41. R. REPETrO, supra note 19, at 90.
42. R. O'TooLE, supra note 18, at xi, 11.
43. Id. at xi, 7.
44. 136 CONG. REc. S16498 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990) (statement of Sen. Fowler).
45. R. REPETro, supra note 19, at 97.
46. R. O'TooLE, supra note 18, at xi. See also Cortner & Schweitzer, Institutional Limits
to National Public Planning for Forest Resources: The Resources Planning Act, 21 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 203, 215-21 (1981).
47. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 18, at xi, 14. See also FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEI"T OV
AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE FOREST SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 1981, at 2 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter 1981 ANNUAL REPORT].
48. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 18, at xi.
49. Id. at 14.
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courage the Forest Service to continue its inefficient practices."° The
Forest Service must return twenty-five percent of its gross timber sale
receipts to local governments, which therefore exert great pressure on the
federal government to maintain a high volume of sales.5 The majority of
the Forest Service's budget, however, comes directly from Congress,
which has traditionally sought to provide jobs and generate income for
local constituents, rather than to maximize the forests' profits. 2 There
is, therefore, little or no incentive for Forest Service managers to balance
expenses against net income or long-term benefits to the region. 53
B. The Tongass National Forest
Although the Forest Service's policies are inefficient nationwide, the
most egregious example is in the Tongass National Forest in southeast
Alaska. ' Many of the factors which promote nonsustainable timber
harvesting in the Tongass are typical of U.S. national forests as a
whole.55 Congress and the Forest Service have encouraged development
of the timber industry in southeastern Alaska to increase employment
and stabilize the region's economy.5 6 In the absence of subsidies, high
labor and construction costs would have prevented the development of a
timber industry in southeastern Alaska.57
In the 1950s the Forest Service awarded four fifty-year contracts for
private companies to harvest timber from the Tongass, in order to create
jobs and attract settlers to the region.58 The two contracts still in effect
are held by the Ketchikan Pulp Company and the Alaska Pulp Corpora-
50. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 207 (statement of Gay-
lord Nelson for the Wilderness Society); see also Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 46, at 219-
21.
51. See 1981 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 47, at 3; see also Hearings on the Tongass
Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 207 (statement of Gaylord Nelson for the Wilderness
Society).
52. R. O'TOOLE, supra note 18, at xi.
53. Id
54. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 201 (statement of Gay-
lord Nelson for the Wilderness Society).
55. See generally WILDERNESS SOCIETY, REPORT ON THE TONGASS NATIONAL FOREST
(1986).
56. 136 CONG. REc. S7731 (daily ed. June 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Johnston, sponsor
of H.R. 987 in the Senate).
57. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ALASKA NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS AND CONSERVA-
TON ACT, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. N-ws 5070, 5169.
58. Timber Industry Practices in the Tongass National Forest, Alaska: Oversight Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Mining, Forest Management, and Bonneville Power Administration of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1983) [hereinafter
Oversight Hearing on Timber Industry Practices] (statement of Max Peterson, Chief of the
Forest Service).
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tion.59 Despite concern that the two companies would arrange markets
and fix prices between themselves, the Forest Service did not oversee in-
dustry practices.' In 1975 the only remaining independent logging com-
pany brought suit against the two pulp mills alleging violations of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.6" The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
findings that the two industries had been guilty of antitrust violations,
including collusion, conspiracy, preclusive and collusive bidding, elimi-
nation of competition, and depression of prices for the Tongass National
Forest.62 Pursuant to the district court's findings, the Forest Service ap-
pointed its own review team, which reached the same conclusions. 63 De-
spite Forest Service requests, the Department of Justice chose not to
pursue the matter.6 As a result, the two companies continue to control
forty-five percent of the region's sawmill capacity at a cost to the govern-
ment of more than eighty million dollars.65
The amount of timber which the contracts committed to the two
companies also jeopardizes compliance with the Forest Service's multi-
ple-use mandate.6 6 Since the two contracts were negotiated before the
existence of either MUSY or NFMA, the pulp companies did not have to
comply with those statutes' guidelines for timber harvesting. 67 Both the
House of Representatives and the Forest Service acknowledge that the
contracts prevent proper management of the forest and limit the Forest
Service's discretion to determine where harvests should occur.68
In 1980 Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act (ANILCA), which designated 5.4 million acres of the Ton-
59. The Alaska Pulp Company and the Ketchikan Pulp Corporation hold timber sale
contracts numbered 12-11-010-1545 and A1Ofs-1042, respectively. See H.R. 987, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess., tit. III (1990). Of the six contracts, two were never awarded and two were either
canceled or shortened. Oversight Hearing on Timber Industry Practices, supra note 58, at 11
(statement of Max Peterson, Chief of the Forest Service).
60. Oversight Hearing on Timber Industry Practices, supra note 58, at 2 (statement of Rep,
Weaver, Chairman of the Subcomm.).
61. Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d "1292, 1295 (9th Cir. 1983),
cerL denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983).
62. 699 F.2d at 1295-98.
63. Oversight Hearing on Timber Industry Practices, supra note 58, at 1, 2.
64. Id. at 11-14.
65. Id at 1-2.
66. 136 CONG. REc. S7732 (daily ed. June 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Johnston).
67. Hearing on H.R. 987, supra note 17, at 347.
68. H.R. 1516, tit. II, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Defendant's Memorandum in Opposi-
tion to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 6, Tenakee Springs v. Courtright, 1987
WL 90272 (D. Ala. 1986) (No. 586-0024).
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gass as wilderness, in order to protect those areas from development."
In order to offset concerns that the wilderness designations would ad-
versely affect local economies by removing those lands from the timber
supply, Congress added section 705 of ANILCA.70 Section 705(a) pro-
vided that Congress would automatically appropriate 40 million dollars
annually to maintain the Tongass timber supply at 4.5 billion board feet
per year.71 Section 705(d) exempted the Tongass from the NFMA re-
quirement that national forests limit timber harvesting to those lands
which the Forest Service has identified as economically and physically
suitable lands for such harvesting.7 2 No other National Forest was ex-
empt from the annual congressional appropriations process or NFMA
requirements for determining land suitability and allowable cut.73
ANILCA sections 705(a) and (d) cost more than 40 million dollars annu-
ally, in exchange for a market demand of less than 450 million board feet
per year.7 Representative Bruce Vento (D. Minn.), one of the sponsors
of legislation to reform practices on the Tongass, stated that instead of
improving the forest's management, ANILCA section 705 promoted
"building roads to get to trees that [could not] be sold or that [could] be
only sold at a loss.""
Although the Forest Service has subsidized the Tongass National
Forest since the beginning of the century, the subsidies have failed to
provide additional employment in southeast Alaska.76 In fact, the
number of timber jobs has declined by more than forty percent since
1980 and will continue to do so whether or not the Forest Service subsi-
dizes the industry.7 7 Rather than create jobs and stable communities in
southeast Alaska, Forest Service subsidies impair long-term economic
strength.7" Tourism, the region's fastest growing employer, provides as
many jobs as the timber industry; each provides about seven percent of
69. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371
(1980) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 539d, 539e, 1132, 3101-3233 (1985)).
70. 136 CONG. REC. S7732 (daily ed. June 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Johnston); see also
125 CONG. REC. 11,130 (1979).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 539d(a) (1985).
72. la § 539d(d).
73. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1.
74. GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFICE, TONGASS NATIONAL FoREST: TiMBEi PRovisioN
oF THE ALASKA LANDS Acr NEEDS CLAMFICATION 57 (1988); see also HLR REP. No. 600,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988) (report to accompany IR. 1516).
75. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 5.
76. See ia at 199 (statement of Gaylord Nelson for the Wilderness Society).
77. Id at 195, 201.
78. See id at 200-01; see also Hearing on the Tongass National Forest, supra note 1, at 80
(testimony of Rep. Mrazek).
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the region's employment.7 9 The fishing industry, which is the region's
largest private employer, provides ten percent of the region's full-time
jobs. 0 However, both the fishing and tourism industries depend upon
sustainable natural resources, which are destroyed by the Forest Service's
timber practices."'
Clearcutting and excessive harvest levels impair tourism and fish
habitat, and cannot even be sustained for the timber industry.8 2 As
much as fifty percent of the Tongass' productive forestland has been
logged since 1950, yet reforestation requires over one hundred years and
cannot produce the most valuable, old-growth trees.8" Bald eagles,
brown bears, and deer all require old-growth forests for habitat and for-
age." In addition, timber harvesting raises stream temperatures, which
young fish cannot tolerate, and adversely affects stream flow.85 Finally,
the even-aged forests which replace the old-growth forests cannot sup-
port an equal diversity of wildlife because the trees are too close together
and do not provide the various types of habitat necessary to the forest's
wildlife.86
The timber industry's strongest supporters have begun to realize
that the Tongass is not indestructible, and that the government must al-
ter its management practices. 7 Not only have taxpayers wasted millions
of dollars on timber subsidies, but our irresponsible environmental prac-
tices have impeded efforts to reform other rain forest countries' policies.
IM. FOREST POLICY IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON
In many ways, the reasons for destruction of the Brazilian Amazon
seem obvious. The country has a foreign debt of 111 billion dollars to
repay, a large class of landless poor, and a vast source of raw materials in
the Amazon region.88 Yet overpopulation, rural poverty, and agricul-
tural conversion are not the principal causes of forest destruction in the
79. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 199; Hearing on the
Tongass National Forest, supra note 1, at 79.
80. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 199.
81. Hearing on H.R. 987, supra note 17, at 369, 370 (statemnt of Frances A. Hunt, on
behalf of the National Wildlife Federation).
82. Hearing on the Tongass National Forest, supra note 1, at 80.
83. Wilson, Threats to Biodiversity, Sc. AM., Sept. 1989, at 108, 112 (spec. issue),
84. Hearing on H.R. 987, supra note 17, at 371-73 (statement of Frances A. Hunt).
85. Id. at 374 (statement of Frances A. Hunt).
86. 136 CONG. REc. S7741 (daily ed. June 12, 1990) (statement of Sen. Wirth).
87. 136 CONG. REc. S7862 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Sen, Johnston).
88. Linden, Playing with Fire, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 77.
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Amazon basin.8 9 In Brazil, as in many rain forest countries, deforesta-
tion has resulted primarily from government policies such as tax incen-
tives and subsidies to develop the land.9° The government has in fact
spent as much to develop the region as has been earned from its efforts.9 1
Several factors motivated the government's Amazon policies: the extrac-
tion of resources for quick capital fixes; the desire to assert its sovereignty
over the region; creation of an investment climate for foreign corpora-
tions and governments; and an attempt to relocate some of its popula-
tion.92 As one observer has noted, destroying the rain forest is a means
of avoiding "real problems by pursuing chimeras: a 'license to print
money' which yields quick cash at the cost of ultimate catastrophe.2
93
A. Government Development
The Amazon has long been the target of government development
projects because of its vast land area, sparse population, and wealth of
natural resources. 94 After World War II, the government began actively
seeking direct public sector investment in the region's infrastructure."
The 1946 Constitution provided for a percentage of tax revenues to be
invested in the Amazon region, and in 1953 the government created a
regional development organization to administer the program. 96 In the
last few decades, the Brazilian government has spent billions of dollars
for road building, hydroelectric dams, cattle and farming subsidies, and
mining projects. 97
In 1966 the military government of President Castello Branco
launched "Operation Amazonia."9 The government created the Super-
intendency for Development of the Amazon (SUDAM) to stimulate and
coordinate public and private development efforts.9 9 SUDAM adminis-
tered financial incentives including tax breaks, low interest loans, relaxed
89. RK REpnrro, supra note 19, at 73-76; see also Guppy, supra note 5, at 928-32.
90. P, REPErrO, supra note 19, at vii.
91. S. BUNKER, supra note 16, at 93.
92. Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 248, 249.
93. Guppy, supra note 5, at 932.
94. S. BUNKER, supra note 16, at 85-87; see also Benchimol, Population Changes in the
Brazilian Amazon, in THE FRONTIER AFrER A DECADE OF COLONIZATION 41 (3. Hemming
ed. 1985).
95. S. ROBOmK, BRAZmL: A STUDY IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS 76-78 (1975).
96. 1d
97. Chi. Tribune, Nov. 30, 1990, at 29, coL C.
98. Comment, The Promised Land- Analysis of Environmental Factors of United States
Investment in and Development of the Amazon Region in Brazil, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 517,
522 (1982).
99. S. BUNKER, supra note 16, at 84.
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credit requirements, and direct subsidies. t° In addition, SUDAM
granted significant concessions to foreign companies to encourage invest-
ment in the Amazon region.101 The agency's tax incentives also allowed
large investors to spend up to fifty percent of their tax debts on develop-
ment projects, usually for mining and road building projects."°
In the following decades, the government created several additional
agencies to attract settlers and promote economic development.103
Programa de Integracao Nacional (PIN) was created in 1970 for high-
way construction; the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian
Reform (INCRA) was created to oversee highway construction, resettle-
ment and land division projects; and POLAMOZONIA was created to
encourage exploitation of the region's natural resources, such as mining
and land for cattle ranching and farming."°4
Foreign governments and international development agencies
funded many of the Amazon region's development projects.' 5 Most of
the loans for Amazonian highway development came from the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank.106 The U.S. Agency
for International Development (EJSAID) gave loans for technical assist-
ance, the U.S. Army gave direct aid to the Brazilian Army Corps of En-
gineers for highway construction, and the Inter-American Development
Bank granted loans for both highway and dam construction projects.1 7
The degree of foreign investment is particularly ironic since one of
the Brazilian government's primary motivations for development was the
assertion of sovereignty over the Amazon.0 ' The Brazilian government
has long regarded the forests of the Amazon as havens for resistance
forces." 9 Several of the other countries which border the Amazon, par-
ticularly Peru and Venezuela, have also attempted to secure their borders
by relocating or attracting new populations to the region.' 10 Very similar
to the Western United States, the government sought to encourage set-
100. S. ROBOCK, supra note 95, at 77.
101. S. BUNKER, supra note 16, at 84.
102. Id at 84-89.
103. See generally E. MORAN, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE TRANSAMAZON
HIGHWAY 18 (1976).
104. Id at 1, 5; Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 249.
105. BRAZIL: INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTHWEST FRONTIER, REPORT TO
THE WORLD BANK 3 (1981).
106. Plumwood & Routley, supra note 11, at 20.
107. Guppy, supra note 5, at 940.
108. Plumwood & Routley, supra note 11, at 9.
109. Id at 11.
110. D. MAHAR, FRONTIER DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN BRAZIL: A STUDY OF AMAZONIA
11(1979).
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tiers to brave the frontier to protect it from outside forces."1
The Brazilian government sought not only to assert its sovereignty
over the Amazon basin, but also to reap the quick rewards of the region's
seemingly endless natural resources."' The Amazon region has been the
source of quick extraction and exploitation of natural resources for cen-
turies." '3 In addition to the Amazon's valuable timber, the government
has regarded the area as a nearly limitless source of land and minerals."I4
Recent discoveries of extensive iron and bauxite reserves, and major gov-
ernment initiatives to promote their exploitation, have only accelerated
the development process in the region." 5 In addition to the forest clear-
ing necessary for the mines themselves, large-scale mining projects also
require additional roads and accompanying development." 6
B. Effect of Brazil's Development Policy
The largest beneficiaries of the government's development policies
have been the highway builders, the large cattle ranchers, and the corpo-
rate developers. 7 According to estimates from the Brazilian Institute of
Forestry Development for the years 1966 through 1975, large-scale cattle
raising projects and the government highway construction program ac-
counted for more than three times as much forest destruction as did
peasants and small farmers."" The government's tax and credit incen-
tives have created over twelve million hectares of large cattle ranches in
the Amazon region, even though most ranches could cover less than half
their costs without these subsidies.' 19
The cattle ranches which replace the forests have also failed to re-
lieve urban pressures since the ranches provide an average of only one job
per three thousand hectares of land. 120 Even without the land in the
Amazon Basin, there is enough cultivable land in Brazil to give 2.3 acres
to each individual Brazilian, and 10 acres to each family-much more
land than is available in the United States. 21 With so much land and so
few people, Brazil should be able to afford to leave large areas of the
111. Id; see also Linden, supra note 88, at 79.
112. Guppy, supra note 5, at 928, 931.
113. S. BuNKEP, supra note 16, at 12.
114. Id at 88-92.
115. d at 86.
116. Ia at 88-89.
117. Plumwood & Routley, supra note 11, at 7.
118. Id
119. R. REPErro, supra note 19, at vii-vi.
120. Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 249.
121. Guppy, supra note 5, at 939.
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forest intact. 122 Instead, the government's resettlement programs have
encouraged migrants and ranchers to clear ever more forest area.1 23
The Brazilian government has encouraged developers and settlers to
convert land to pastures and farms which cannot be sustained on the
soils of the Amazon region. 2 INCRA, the agency responsible for settle-
ment programs in the region, grants title to lands after the occupier
makes "improvements" to it, which consist primarily of clearing the for-
ests.1"I Since the tax incentives are based upon clearing the land, settlers
usually clear the trees by burning, rather than cutting and selling them
for their timber value. 2 6 Yet, once the forests are cleared, the soils dete-
riorate rapidly and within a few years can no longer support cattle or
crops.1 27 Instead of making the collective benefits of the rain forest avail-
able to all or most local inhabitants, the government has caused the for-
ests to be logged or burned so as to redistribute the wealth upwards,
primarily to existing affluent groups such as ranchers and land
speculators.1 28
Private industries and local interests have not been the only causes
of Brazil's destructive forest policies. Brazil, like the United States, has
created a very large, powerful bureaucracy which is fairly autonomous in
its power and which depends on continued forest destruction for its
budget.129 Many of the loans for development of the Amazon were given
to government agencies which administered the large-scale investment
projects, rather than allowing banks and private businesses to do so.'30
The national government gave funds to local and state governments to
develop roads and communications systems, and to make investment
credits available for agriculture. 3 '
The bureaucracy has burgeoned, and planning has become highly
centralized, with an emphasis on grandiose schemes that are best de-
scribed as "infrastructuritis."' 32 Agencies such as INCRA receive a sub-
stantial part of their budgets from tax revenues, which are tied to the size
122. Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 248.
123. Id. at 249.
124. R. REPETrO, supra note 19, at vii.
125. Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 249.
126. E. MoR.AN, supra note 103, at 1, 92.
127. Plumwood & Routley, supra note 11, at 13.
128. Id.; see also Guppy, supra note 5, at 942 ("A very few investors, a few multinationals,
and the highway developers made money. Brazil as a whole has lost heavily.").
129. Guppy, supra note 5, at 945.
130. Id
131. E. MORAN, supra note 103, at 84.
132. Guppy, supra note 5, at 945.
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of development and land sale projects.1 33 Therefore, the Amazonian de-
velopment agencies have little incentive to economize. In addition, in-
creases in regional income which are based on these government
expenditures will not benefit the region once the development projects
are completed. 134
The Amazon basin is capable of supporting far more economic, sus-
tainable uses than those promoted by the Brazilian government. The in-
tact rain forest produces at least ten times as much food in the form of
fiuit, game, and fish as the pastures which replace it.135 Fish bred in the
flooded regions would produce more protein per acre than do cattle.'36
In fact, a single Brazil nut tree or pupuia palm tree produces more food
than an acre worth of cattle. 37 Brazil also imports two-thirds of its rub-
ber, despite the fact that it would have more than enough from the for-
ests which are cut and burned. 131 Perhaps most remarkably, the
Amazon region stores at least seventy-five billion tons of carbon in its
trees, 139 while many regions such as Rondonia import most of their
fuel."4 Since government subsidies are based on the amount of land
cleared, ranchers and settlers usually leave the cut trees to rot or burn
them, rather than storing them for fuel.' 4'
Brazil's subsidies and development programs have not provided eco-
nomic stability in the Amazon region. Like the U.S. forest policy, Bra-
zil's development programs have hastened the destruction of valuable
natural resources which could instead provide for sustainable forestry
uses.
IV. LEGISLATION TO PROTECT THE RAIN FORESTS
Both the U.S and the Brazilian governments are aware of the extent
and consequences of their rain forests' destruction. 42 The two countries
have approved reforms in the last few months to protect their forests.
133. E. MORAN, supra note 103, at 110.
134. S. BUNKER, supra note 16, at 93-94.
135. Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 249.
136. Guppy, supra note 5, at 941.
137. Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 249.
138. Guppy, supra note 5, at 941.
139. Linden, supra note 88, at 78.
140. Guppy, supra note 5, at 941.
141. Id. at 941-42; S. BUNKER, supra note 16, at 92.
142. See Hearing on the Tongass National Forest, supra note 1, at 84-85, 107-08; see also
Deputy Sees Adoption of New Constitution with Title on Environment by End of 1987, 10 Int'l
Envt. Rep. (BNA) 493-94 (1987).
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The United States has enacted the Tongass Timber Reform Act,1 43 and
Brazil has suspended many of the tax incentives and subsidies for devel-
opment in the Amazon region."4 Both reforms promise to slow the rate
of deforestation, yet neither policy is adequate to protect the forests in
perpetuity.
A. Tongass Timber Reform Act
After several unsuccessful attempts to pass legislation which would
reform management of the Tongass National Forest, Congress enacted
the Tongass Timber Reform Act (the Act) in the fall of 1990.145 The Act
represents a compromise between the House and Senate versions, and
between supporters and opponents of timber reform for the Tongass.146
The Act eliminates the direct appropriation of 40 million dollars and the
mandated harvest of 450 million board feet annually.1 47 The Act also
restores the National Forest Management Act requirement that the Ton-
gass achieve a sustainable harvest level which meets multiple-use objec-
tives. 141 In addition, the Act withdraws slightly over a million acres
from the timber base, of which approximately one-third is designated as
wilderness. 149 The other 722,482 acres are classified to exclude timber
harvesting, but are classified to permit roads, hydroelectric projects, min-
ing, and other uses.150 Finally, the conference bill establishes buffer
zones along streams and tributaries which are important to the fisheries
industry. 5 ' The buffer zones prevent timber harvesting within 100 feet
of the rivers.'-2
Although the Senate and House disagreed on the amount of land to
be withdrawn from the timber base, the most contentious issue for the
143. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990).
144. Long, Progress in Brazil: Crackdown Stems the Destruction of Amazon Forest, L.A.
Times, Sept. 28, 1990, at AS, col. 1.
145. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990); 136 CONG.
REc. S17795-99 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
146. 136 CONG. REc. S.17795-99 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Johnston).
147. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 101, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990).
148. Id; NFMA, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 6(k), 90 Stat. 2949, 2955-56 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1604(k) (1974)).
149. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, §§ 201-202, 104 Stat, 4426, 4428-
30 (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 931, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1990) [hereinafter H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 931].
150. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, §§ 201-202, 104 Stat. 4426, 4428-
30 (1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 931, supra note 149, at 16-17.
151. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 103, 104 Stat. 4426, 4426-27
(1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 931, supra note 149, at 14.
152. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 103, 104 Stat. 4426, 4426-27
(1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 931, supra note 149, at 14.
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Conference Committee to resolve was the future of the two fifty-year
contracts. 53 While the final compromise more closely reflects the House
provisions to protect lands from timber harvesting, the Senate appears to
have won the contracts issue. The Senate bill modified the fifty-year con-
tracts by requiring that the two companies sell timber from the Tongass
at competitive prices, and that the companies not harvest a dispropor-
tionate amount of old-growth trees." 4 The House bill would simply
have cancelled the contracts.15 1 The Act as finally adopted does not can-
cel the contracts; however, it requires the Forest Service to determine
where to allow timber harvesting, prohibits the two companies from cut-
ting a disproportionate amount of old-growth trees, and requires the
mills to pay a price "comparable to" fair market value for the timber
they cut.156
The Tongass Timber Reform Act redresses many of the harms
caused by ANILCA and the two fifty-year contracts, but it does not en-
sure sustainable forestry practices. The Act provides for greater protec-
tion of old-growth trees, fisheries, and wildlife by setting aside more than
a million acres from the timber base and reinstating multiple-use objec-
tives.157 The Act will also save taxpayers tens of millions of dollars each
year by discontinuing the direct appropriation to the Tongass. s" On the
other hand, the compromise directs the Forest Service to supply enough
timber to meet the market demand when setting its harvest goals, a re-
quirement not imposed on any other national forest. 159 The Act also
allows the Forest Service to ignore economic factors when it identifies
lands which are suitable for timber production.1" In addition, while the
Act protects over a million acres from timber harvesting, only 299,152
acres are protected from mining, hydroelectric projects, roads, and other
153. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 931, supra note 149, at 16-19; 136 CONG. R. S17995-99
(daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
154. H.R. 987, tit. m, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); HLtL CONF. REP. No. 931, supra note
149, at 18-19.
155. H.R. 987, tit. m, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); HMR. CoNF. REP. No. 931, supra note
149, at 18.
156. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 301(cX8), 104 Stat. 4426, 4431
(1990); 136 CONG. RFc. S17997 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Murkowski).
157. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, tits. 1, III, 104 Stat. 4426, 4426-
28, 4430-32 (1990); 136 CONG. Rmc. S17996 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Johnston).
158. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 101, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990); 136
CONG. REC. S7862 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Murkowslk).
159. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 101, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990); 136
CONG. REc. S7743 (daily ed. June 12, 1990).
160. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 102, 104 Stat. 4426 (1990); H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 931, supra note 149, at 14.
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development. 161
The Act's greatest shortcoming is its failure to cancel the two fifty-
year contracts. Although the Act directs the Forest Service to seek to
accommodate the needs of small timber operators,162 the long-term con-
tracts allow the Ketchikan Pulp Company and the Alaska Pulp Corpora-
tion to continue to dominate the timber industry.' 6' Since the Act
reduces the timber base in the Forest, while retaining the contracts' guar-
anteed harvest volume for the two contract holders, the two companies
will still have an advantage over other logging companies. 164 The com-
promise bill seeks to preserve jobs at the two mills, rather than to protect
the industry as a whole by encouraging competition and providing com-
pensation to displaced workers.
B. Reforms in Brazil
Brazil is also struggling to reform its forest policies. In 1987 the
Brazilian Constitutional Assembly adopted a new chapter on environ-
mental protection which obligates the government to defend and pre-
serve the environment for future generations. 165 The new government of
President Fernando Collor de Mello has also begun to implement re-
forms drafted under the previous administration to control deforestation,
protect native Brazilians, and restrict harmful mining practices.' 66
Collor has abolished many of the tax incentive programs intended to
attract new businesses and promote development of the Amazon re-
gion. 67 Developers may no longer invest their income taxes in the re-
gion rather than paying them to the federal government.168 Collor has
also suspended tax credits for cattle ranchers which were based on the
amount of land they cleared.' 69
In addition to suspending tax incentives and subsidies, the govern-
ment has significantly increased enforcement of permit requirements for
161. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 201, 104 Stat. 4426, 4428-29
(1990); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 931, supra note 149, at 16-17.
162. Tongass Timber Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-626, § 105, 104 Stat. 4426, 4427-28
(1990).
163. 136 CONG. REc. S7743 (daily ed. June 12, 1990).
164. Id
165. See CONsTrruIgAo FEDERAL tit. VIII, ch. 6, art. 262 (1988).
166. House, Brazil Declines Invitation to Conference on Ecology: Sarney Fears Amazon
Will Be Singled Out, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1989, § 1, at A20, col. 1.
167. Bus. INT'L, May 14, 1990.
168. Id
169. Marx, Rain Forest Destruction Slows, But Critics Remain Wary, Chi. Tribune, Nov.
30, 1990, at 29; see also Brazil Beefs up Efforts Aimed at Slowing Amazon Deforestation, 13 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 483 (1990) [hereinafter Brazil Beefs up Efforts].
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activities which entail clearing the forests. 7 ' Collor doubled the budget
for IBAMA, the agency responsible for protecting Brazil's environment,
to 156 million dollars. 7 ' In 1990 IBAMA levied more than nine million
dollars in fines for unauthorized cutting and burning, an increase from
three million dollars in 1989.172 Although IBAMA cannot seize lands to
force payment of the fines, it has begun to confiscate hardwood from
loggers who operate without permits. 173  According to Jose
Lutzenberger, Brazil's Secretary of the Environment, these efforts have
reduced forest burning by fifty percent.I7 4 Lutzenberger also opposes the
construction of a major new highway in the state of Acre, additional
hydroelectric development, and several steel mills in the Amazon
region. 175
Color's policies certainly afford the Amazon region greater protec-
tion than it received under previous governments. Nonetheless, environ-
mentalists question whether the government has committed sufficient
funds to implement those policies, and whether such plans will ulti-
mately be effective to prevent further deforestation.' 76 IBAMA's own
director has stated that Brazil does not have enough money to protect
the Amazon. 1
77
Brazil's elections in October 1990 also cast doubt on the likelihood
that Collor's reforms will be successful. 178 Local elections in the Ama-
zon states produced candidates who favor development, particularly of
large mining and agricultural projects.179 The local officials have consid-
erable responsibility for implementing and enforcing federal environmen-
tal policy.' Their election seems to demonstrate local fears that
environmental protection will retard economic growth in the region."'
Brazil's reforms, like the Tongass Timber Reform Act, do not reach
far enough to prevent further deforestation. Under current law, the gov-
ernment must still grant title to lands that have been cleared, which
raises the value of the land, and thereby encourages further land specula-
170. Marx, supra note 169, at 29.
171. Id
172. Long, supra note 144, at A5, col. 1.
173. Id
174. Marx, supra note 169, at 29.
17g. Id
176. Id; Bennet, Destroying the Amazon, Boston Globe, Dec. 20, 1988, at 16, col 1.
177. Marx, supra note 169, at 29.
178. Durmanoski, Brazil Vote Bodes Ill for the Amazon Forest, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 1990,
at 3.
179. Id
180. Id
181. Id
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tion.182 IBAMA also continues to issue permits for farmers to clear fifty
percent of their lands.1"3 Although the government has tightened the
requirements for issuing individual permits,'" it has not established a
regional plan to determine which areas should be left undisturbed and
which are appropriate for clearing and cultivation.
Brazil, like the United States, has instituted reforms of the laws and
practices which cause deforestation. Most significantly, both govern-
ments have discontinued many of the subsidies which promoted destruc-
tion of their rain forests. On the other hand, neither country's reforms
are broad enough to provide sufficient protection of their rain forests.
V. COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AND
BRAZILIAN FOREST POLICIES
Both the Tongass and the Amazon forests are clearcut or burned at
rates that cannot be sustained.18 5 Economic development and stability
do not justify the rates of destruction when sustainable, profitable alter-
natives exist. Local political and economic pressures constitute the most
obvious influences on the two nations' forestry policies, but entrenched
bureaucratic interests also significantly affect those policies.' 86
Both U.S. and Brazilian forestry policies developed primarily to cre-
ate jobs and provide economic stability to the regions.18 7 In southeastern
Alaska, the Forest Service sought to offset a temporary decline in the
fishing industry with timber jobs.' 88 In Brazil, the government sought to
relieve urban poverty by attracting settlers to the Amazon basin.189 In
both countries, however, the subsidies and development programs have
failed to provide additional jobs, and actually harm many future job op-
portunities by destroying potential resources. 90 The subsidies and tax
incentives have resulted, instead, in enormous benefits to certain private
industries which wield considerable economic and political power.191 In
182. Brazil Beefs up Efforts, supra note 169, at 483.
183. Long, supra note 144, at A5, col 1.
184. Chapoval, Conviction in Amazon Trial Brings Hope for Change, Reuters, Dec. 17,
1990 (BC cycle).
185. Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 248; Hearing on H.R. 987, supra note 17, at 14-15
(statement of Rep. Mrazek).
186. R. REPETro, supra note 19, at vii.
187. Oversight Hearing on Timber Industry Practices, supra note 58, at 10-11;
Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 249.
188. Oversight Hearing on Timber Industry Practices, supra note 58, at 10.
189. Lutzenberger, supra note 12, at 249.
190. Id.; Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 1, 5.
191. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1989, at A18, col. 1; Oversight Hearing on Timber Industry
Practices, supra note 58, at 11.
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Brazil, the largest beneficiaries of the government's development policies
have been the highway builders and cattle ranchers, who together have
accounted for more than sixty percent of the deforestation in the Ama-
zon region.192 In Alaska, the two pulp companies control a virtual mo-
nopoly over the timber industry at an enormous cost to taxpayers and
other developing industries.' 93
Development programs and subsidies in the United States and Bra-
zil have also created enormous, unwieldy bureaucracies, whose budgets
depend in part on continued forest destruction. 194 The Forest Service's
budget relies to a large extent on the nearly 300 million dollars it retains
from timber sale receipts.1' In the Amazon region, the development
agencies' budgets are tied to land clearing and loans for development.' 96
The United States and Brazil have begun to reform their forest poli-
cies to reflect greater appreciation of their forests' values. The two coun-
tries have curtailed subsidies which promote deforestation, and both have
imposed stricter requirements for forest cutting. However, both coun-
tries' reforms are based on the erroneous assumption that environmental
protection is only achieved at the expense of economic efficiency. Under-
standably, then, the Tongass Timber Reform Act and Color's reform
policies compromise on forest protection.
Both the U.S. and Brazilian governments have focused their reforms
more on the symptoms than on the causes of deforestation. Although the
two countries have imposed limits on further destruction of their forests,
the reforms do not induce the affected bureaucracies and industries to
change their practices. Reforms which simply prevent future develop-
ment and subsidies are insufficient to alleviate the harms caused by in-
dustries and bureaucracies which depend on destruction of the forests.
VI. PROPOSAL
Neither the United States nor Brazil can afford to continue to subsi-
dize the destruction of its forests. The burden on taxpayers and other
industries is enormous, and the harm to the environment is unacceptable.
The United States and Brazil should instead promote sustainable alterna-
tives by subsidizing the transition to such uses and setting aside sufficient
wilderness areas and forest reserves to protect the biological diversity of
our rain forests. Mr. Fabio Feldmann, a leading supporter of the envi-
192. Plumwood & Routley, supra note 11, at 7.
193. Oversight Hearing on Timber Industry Practices, supra note 58, at 1, 11.
194. Guppy, supra note 5, at 945; R. O'TooL, supra note 18, at xi.
195. 1. O'ToOLE, supra note 18, at xi.
196. E. MoRAN, supra note 103, at 84, 92.
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ronment in the Brazilian National Congress, has stated that in order to
protect the rain forests, governments must change their whole idea of
development, "to have a revolution of sorts." '197
The United States and Brazil must discontinue subsidies to develop-
ers and timber harvesters. Timber harvesting would then decline consid-
erably. 9 The market, unlike the responsible government agencies,
would amortize the replacement cost of trees cut or destroyed. 199 The
prices of forest products would rise until supply truly meets demand, in
preference to the artificial supply-sided programs which exist now.2°°
In addition, both governments should charge royalties or use fees
which would encourage conservation of the forests' resources.201 In Bra-
zil, the structure of royalties must reflect the scarcity and value of certain
resources and the relative availability of others.2" The Tongass should
also revise its fee schedule to reflect the true market value of the trees
harvested, including amortization of past subsidies.20 3
Both countries should sell logging concessions competitively, as the
United States does with offshore oil leases.2° + Higher license fees and
royalties would discourage harvesting areas of marginal timber values
and using ecologically harmful methods. 20  Although market forces
alone provide insufficient protection of the rain forests, U.S. and Brazil-
ian policies have actually exacerbated exploitation and impaired conser-
vation of their forests.2°6
A replacement or depletion tax on forest products to reflect the
world's diminishing forest reserves would also help maintain rain for-
ests.20 7 A replacement tax would help fund restoration and preservation
of the forests. The depletion tax would represent the value of forest re-
sources which cannot be replaced. Both taxes should be used to create a
trust fund to protect the forests' future and provide compensation to rain
forest countries as their resources are depleted.208
The United States and Brazil must actively promote sustainable uses
197. See generally Plumwood & Routley, supra note 11.
198. R. O'TooLE, supra note 18, at xii, 235-37.
199. Guppy, supra note 5, at 953.
200. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8. at 208.
201. R. REPETrO, supra note 19, at 32-33.
202. Id
203. R. O'TooLE, supra note 18, at 213.
204. R. REPETro, supra note 19, at 34.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 37.
207. Guppy, supra note 5, at 961.
208. Rubinoff, Tropical Forests: Can We Afford Not to Give Them a Future?, 12 ECOLOGIST
253, 254 (1982).
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of their forests. Both the Amazon rain forest and the Tongass National
Forest are capable of supporting alternative, sustainable uses which
would provide much greater economic stability to the regions. °9 Extrac-
tion of natural resources at a nonsustainable rate harms the two regions
far more than it benefits them.210 The Tongass is capable of supporting a
sustained timber yield along with growing fishing and tourism indus-
tries.21' The Amazon is also capable of sustainable agricultural uses,
such as fishing, tropical fruit and nut harvesting, rubber tapping, and
selective timber harvesting, rather than the nonsustainable slash and
burn practice most commonly employed at present.212
The United States and Brazil must also establish forest reserves
large enough to protect the biological diversity of rain forest ecosystems.
Brazil should set aside contiguous blocks of virgin rain forest, as the Ton-
gass Timber Reform Act has begun to do, rather than preserving only
fifty percent of each tract which is developed. Both governments must
assess which lands are suitable for agriculture and development, and
which lands are more valuable with their forests intact. Road building
should be limited to areas which have already been deforested, and land
transfers should be closely regulated to prevent further forest destruc-
tion.213 The Brazilian government should no longer reward forest clear-
ing by granting title to the land cleared. Instead, it should impose a tax
on land transfers to stop deforestation caused by land speculation.
In Brazil, some of the lands which are set aside could be used as
"extractive reserves," which would permit rubber tapping, nut gathering,
and other uses which exploit but do not damage the rain forest.2"4 Brazil
should also set aside environmentally sensitive lands in national parks.
Other countries which do not possess rain forests would have to help
finance these alternatives since national parks cost hundreds of millions
of dollars that Brazil cannot afford. Mandatory financial assistance
would be reasonable since countries without rain forests would also bene-
fit from the preservation of biological diversity and the reduction of cli-
209. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 199; Plumwood & Rout-
ley, supra note 11, at 7.
210. Hearing on the Tongass National Forest, supra note 1, at I07-08.
211. Hearings on the Tongass Timber Reform Act, supra note 8, at 199.
212. See Plumwood & Routley, supra note 11; see also Hearing on the Tongass National
Forest, supra note 1, at 107-08.
213. See generally D. MAHA.I, GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND DE-ORESrATION IN BRA-
zm's AMAZON REGION, discussed in Brezina, Brazil Should Slash Economic Incentives for
Forest Clearing, U.P.L, Feb. 13, 1989.
214. Chapoval, supra note 184.
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matic changes caused by deforestation. 215 Rain forest nations such as
Brazil should receive subsidies based upon the size and value of the areas
which they protect from deforestation.216
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States and Brazil have begun to res'pond to worldwide
concern for the environment, particularly for problems such as rain for-
est destruction and the greenhouse effect.217  Although the Amazon is
without doubt the most dramatic example of the rate of rain forest deci-
mation and the resulting loss of biodiversity, rain forests are being de-
stroyed worldwide for many of the same reasons.218 The United States
has been quick to condemn the Brazilians for their rain forest policies,
while the U.S. Forest Service has carried out an equally unnecessary,
wasteful policy on the Tongass and other national forests.219
Both the United States and Brazil have traditionally perceived
themselves as young nations with limitless resources, which existed for
their own short-term exploitation. Their forest policies reflected the mis-
taken assumption that they could replace the rain forests regardless of
the manner or rate of deforestation. In order to prevent further rain for-
est extinction, the United States and Brazil must be willing to alter their
natural resources policies. Establishment and protection of wilderness
areas, discontinuing tax incentives and subsidies, and providing funding
for the transition to alternative, sustainable uses would slow or prevent
further destruction of the rain forests, and probably save money for the
two governments.
As the world's population grows, its resources become increasingly
scarce. The United States and Brazil must ensure adequate protection
for the irreplaceable natural resources in their custody.
215. Rubinoff, supra note 208, at 254.
.216. Id.
217. In fact, the two problems are related. The fires set by Amazon settlers account for
10% of the carbon dioxide entering the atmosphere, in turn hastening the greenhouse effect.
Debusmann, Destruction of Environment in Latin America Raises Ahrm, Reuters, Dec. 6, 1988
(BC cycle).
218. Other countries whose rain forests are in jeopardy of complete destruction include
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Ghana, and the other countries which contain parts of
the Amazon basin. See generally R. REPETro, supra note 19.
219. See Hearing on the Tongass National Forest, supra note 1, at 107-08. Senator Wirth
pointed out the parallel between practices in the Tongass and in the Amazon: "If we are
saying to the Brazilians manage your forest for a variety of uses, we ought to be doing the same
thing here." Id. at 107. The Assistant Chief of the Forest Service seemed to agree when he
responded that "[w]e have to find ways to demonstrate to them that there are sustainable uses,
sustainable developments for those countries." Id. at 108.
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